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Introduction

The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed (U.S. Const. amend. II).” In 2008 the Supreme Court decided for the first
time what, exactly, the Second Amendment means, in District of Columbia v. Heller.1
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Amendment protects an individual right to
bear arms for self-defense. Two years later the Supreme Court held in McDonald v.
City of Chicago that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right, protecting it from state infringement.2
Initially these two decisions seemed like enormous victories for proponents of gun
rights; they opened the floodgate for challenges to state gun control laws in the
lower courts. As lower courts began hearing challenges, however, it became
apparent that this initial victory for the gun lobby was not as significant as it first
seemed. Since Heller and McDonald were decided lower courts have consistently
rejected challenges to gun control laws. There have been over 1,000 cases
challenging gun control laws since 2008 and 94% of these challenges have been

1
2

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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rejected.3 This thesis will explore why the overwhelming majority of gun control
laws have been upheld after Heller and McDonald significantly expanded the
understanding of the right protected by the Second Amendment. I will argue that the
Second Amendment is inherently unique; the right it protects is unlike any other
constitutionally protected right. The Second Amendment protects the right to own
guns, and the function of guns is to kill people. Guns will always be a public safety
issue because of their potential for harm, and the role of the government is to
promote public safety. This inevitable conflict between the state’s responsibility to
protect public safety and the Second Amendment explains why the right to bear
arms can be regulated in substantial ways.
The debate on gun rights and gun control is one of the most polarizing issues
in the United States. This debate causes so much dispute in our society because guns
have an enormous potential for harm. Eighty people die from gun-related injuries
every day in the United States, on average. This means that guns kill about thirty
thousand people every year.4 In a comprehensive study on the leading causes of
death in 2013, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention reported that of the
192,945 deaths resulting from injury, 33,636 were caused by firearms. 5 The study
found that guns were used in over half of all homicides and suicides; guns were

“Protecting Strong Gun Laws: The Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories Untouched,” Law
Center to Prevent Gun Violence, accessed March 1, 2016, http://smartgunlaws.org/protectingstrong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lower-court-victories-untouched/.
4 Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amicus Curiae, 33, District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
5 “National Center for Health Statistics,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed April
18, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm.
3
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responsible for 11,208 of 16,121 homicides, and 21,175 of 41,149 suicides.6
Furthermore, the accidental discharge of firearms caused 505 deaths in 2013. 7
Because guns are such a pervasive public safety issue, it is important to understand
the ways in which they can be regulated. The decisions of courts regarding Second
Amendment challenges are so significant because they will impact lives. For this
reason it is crucial to understand what the Second Amendment protects.
There are two prevailing theories on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
The first is called the individual-rights theory, and it argues that the Second
Amendment protects the right to bear arms for nonmilitary use. The second is the
collective-right theory, which argues that the Amendment only protects the right to
bear arms for the preservation of a well-regulated militia.8 Before Heller was
decided in 2008, the Supreme Court had never before explicitly endorsed one of the
theories.
The Supreme Court came close to this question in 1939 in United States v.
Miller, when they upheld two men’s federal convictions for transporting an
unregistered short-barreled shotgun over state lines. The Court held that the Second
Amendment does not protect the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double barrel
shotgun because this firearm does not have a reasonable relationship to the
preservation of a well-regulated militia.9 Understandably, this opinion was widely
interpreted to mean that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms
“National Center for Health Statistics,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed April
18, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm.
7 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/injury.htm.
8 Mark Tushnet, Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle Over Guns (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 48.
9 “United States v. Miller,” Oyez: IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed October 15, 2015,
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/307us174.
6
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only in conjunction with the preservation of a well-regulated militia.10 Miller,
however, did not actually answer the question of who is eligible to bear arms. The
opinion decided that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second
Amendment protection, not that the Second Amendment doesn’t protect the right of
individuals to bear arms for nonmilitary use.11
After Miller the collective-right interpretation of the Second Amendment was
generally accepted in law. This changed, however, when a significant body of
scholarship supporting the individual-rights view emerged in the late 1980’s and
1990’s. The individual-rights theory gained traction and became known as the
‘Standard Model.’12 The Standard Model will be discussed further in Chapter 1.
After the popularization of the Standard Model, Heller was deliberately
brought by an independent group of lawyers, against the recommendation of the
National Rifle Association, to ask the Supreme Court to recognize an individual right
to gun ownership. The NRA opposed the case because it was unclear what the
Supreme Court would decide. There are strong arguments for both theories of
Second Amendment interpretation, and it was not certain that the Court would rule
favorably for gun rights.13
Heller challenged the constitutionality of D.C.’s handgun regulations. D.C.
generally prohibited the possession of usable handguns in the home by making it a
crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns.
Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 35.
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 49.
12 Saul Cornell, ed., The Second Amendment on Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller
(Amherst: UMass Press, 2013), Intro.
13 Adam Winkler, Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in America(New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2011), 95.
10
11
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D.C. also required residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded or bound by
a trigger lock.14 Petitioner Dick Anthony Heller was a D.C. police officer who was
authorized to carry a handgun while on duty but wished to keep one at home. Heller
applied for a registration certificate for a handgun and was denied. He filed a lawsuit
challenging D.C.’s laws, claiming that they violated his Second Amendment right to
keep a functional firearm in his home.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
case, and for the first time explicitly answered the question on whether the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep firearms.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court held the Second Amendment does protect
an individual right to own firearms for nonmilitary purposes. The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Scalia, argued that the history and text of the Amendment prove
that it was originally understood to protect an individual right. The bulk of the
Heller opinion was dedicated to a historical analysis on the meaning of the Second
Amendment. After concluding that the Amendment protects an individual right,
however, Justice Scalia made it clear that the right is not unlimited. Heller outlined
certain types of gun control regulations that are constitutional. The opinion then
discussed the specific facts of the case before the Court. Heller articulated that the
‘core’ of the Second Amendment right is that of law-abiding citizens to possess
handguns in the home for the purpose of self-defense. For this reason the Supreme
Court held that D.C.’s handgun ban and trigger-lock requirement are clearly
unconstitutional.16

Heller 554 U.S. 570, 1.
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 2.
16 Heller 554 U.S. 570, syllabus.
14
15
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Heller confirmed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
keep and bear arms for self-defense, but because the District of Columbia falls under
federal jurisdiction, Heller did not consider whether the right applies to the states.
Soon after Heller, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether or not the Second
Amendment right is protected from state infringement in McDonald v. City of
Chicago. In another 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment is fully
applicable to the states.17 The Heller and McDonald opinions will be discussed in
greater depth in Chapter 1.
Heller and McDonald significantly impacted the understanding of the right
protected by the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court held for the first time that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for self-defense.
Proponents of gun rights were hopeful that this expanded understanding of the
Second Amendment right would invalidate a vast array of gun control laws. Since
Heller and McDonald there have been over 1,000 Second Amendment challenges in
the lower courts, however, the overwhelming majority have been rejected.18 This
thesis explores why gun control laws remain unaffected after Heller and McDonald. I
will argue that the Second Amendment is unique because of the conflict between
what it protects, guns, and the duty of the government, public safety. Because of this
relationship, all but the most restrictive gun control laws will survive challenges in
the courts.

McDonald 561 U.S. 742, syllabus.
http://smartgunlaws.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-the-supreme-court-leaves-lower-courtvictories-untouched/.
17
18
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The goal of this thesis is to understand the right protected by the Second
Amendment, as it was codified in Heller and McDonald, and to analyze why the
overwhelming majority of challenges to gun control laws in the lower courts have
been rejected following those decisions. The following sections explain the Standard
Model interpretation of the Second Amendment and summarize the majority
opinions of Heller and McDonald. Chapter 2 looks at what guidance Heller and
McDonald provided for lower courts to analyze future challenges, and outlines the
basic approach that most lower courts have adopted to review Second Amendment
challenges. Chapter 3 discusses the outcome of Second Amendment cases in the
lower courts following Heller and McDonald. The chapter then aims to explain the
outcome and identify the ways in which the Second Amendment is unique.
Following this analysis, Chapter 3 includes case studies of two lower court cases
that considered challenges to two very different gun control laws. The first case,
Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco19 was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and upheld a San Francisco law that requires firearms to be stored in a
locked box or rendered inoperable when not carried on a person. The second case,
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester20, was heard by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and upheld New York’s law requiring an applicant to demonstrate ‘proper
cause’ in order to obtain a concealed carry permit. These case studies aim to
illustrate the unique properties of the Second Amendment in action, and explain
why gun control laws remain unaffected after Heller and McDonald. Finally, I will
offer some brief thoughts on how the death of Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller
19
20

Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 746 F .3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), 1.
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F .3d 81 (2nd Cir, 2012), 1.
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opinion, might affect the Second Amendment in the Supreme Court, and I conclude
that it will not.

10

Chapter 1:
The Meaning of the Second Amendment

There are two schools of thought on the meaning of the Second Amendment.
The individual-rights model claims that the Second Amendment was originally
understood to protect the individual right to bear arms unconnected to militia
service, and the collective-rights model claims that the Second Amendment only
protects the right to bear arms in connection to the preservation of a well-regulated
militia.21 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller (1939), that
firearms unrelated to militia service are not protected by the Second Amendment,
there was a tendency in law to accept the collective-rights view.22
In 1983, constitutional law scholar Don B. Kates published an article in the
Michigan Law Review titled, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment,” which provided an extensive historical and textual analysis
advocating for the individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.23
Kates’ article did not glean much attention at first, but in 1989 Sanford Levinson,
one of the most prominent liberal constitutional law scholars in the country,
published an article called, “The Embarrassing Second Amendment,” in the Yale Law
Review, which suggested that the individual-rights theory may be correct and
Tushnet, Out of Range, 48.
Tushnet, Out of Range, 63.
23 Don B. Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” Michigan
Law Review (1983): 204-273, accessed October 15, 2015,
http://www.constitution.org/2ll/2ndschol/57mich.pdf.
21
22
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endorsed Kates’ article.24 Levinson’s article changed the entire arena of Second
Amendment interpretation; his endorsement made the individual rights argument
respectable.25 In the wake of Kates’ and Levinson’s articles, scholarly work on the
Second Amendment took off.26 Much of the emerging body of literature favored the
individual-rights model; over 125 law review articles supporting the individualrights model were published by 1999.27 The individual-rights model became known
as the ‘Standard Model.’28
The Supreme Court had never officially considered the meaning of the
Second Amendment until they agreed to hear District of Columbia v. Heller. When the
Court granted certiorari to Heller, it was unclear what they would decide. Both the
Standard Model and collective-right interpretation of the Second Amendment are
grounded by strong arguments. Mark Tushnet, a prominent constitutional law
scholar and professor at Harvard Law School, argues that the ‘correct’ interpretation
of the Second Amendment right varies by judicial philosophy. He says that the
Standard Model is a slightly stronger argument from an originalist perspective,
meaning in terms of what the Second Amendment was originally understood to
protect when it was adopted, but that the collective-right interpretation is favored
when considering other components that go into legal arguments, such as Supreme

Sanford Levinson, “The Embarrassing Second Amendment,” Yale Law Review (1989): 637-639,
accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.constitution.org/mil/embar2nd.htm.
25 Winkler, Gunfight, 95.
26 Cornell, The Second Amendment on Trial, Introduction.
27 Winkler, Gunfight, 95.
28 Tushnet, Out of Range, 3.
24
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Court precedents. Tushnet makes the point that it is impossible to discern which
interpretation is ‘correct.’29
In a 5-4 decision, the Heller Court held that the Second Amendment does
protect an individual right to bear arms for purposes unrelated to militia service,
endorsing the Standard Model. Justice Scalia, who is known for his unwavering
dedication to originalism as a legal theory, wrote the majority opinion.30 The
opinion undertook a thorough historical and textual analysis of the Second
Amendment to determine what the original meaning of the Amendment was when it
was drafted and ratified. Justice Scalia argued that the well-established English right
of an individual to bear arms was fundamental to the colonists at the time of the
Second Amendment’s conception, and that the specific text and the relationship
between the clauses in the Amendment further support that the right was not only
protected in the context of militia service.31
It is important to note that there is a considerable amount of disagreement
on the Standard Model and that there were two significant dissenting opinions in
Heller. Justice Stevens issued a dissenting opinion in Heller in which he argued that
the Second Amendment only protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain
military purposes. He disputed the historical and textual analysis of the Heller
majority, and insisted that the collective-rights theory is both the most natural

Tushnet, Out of Range, xvi.
Nelson Lund, “The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence,” in The Second
Amendment on Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller, ed. Saul Cornell et al. (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), 148-186.
31 Joyce Lee Malcolm, “Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent [The Right Inherited From England],” in The Second Amendment on
Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller, ed. Saul Cornell et al. (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2011), 31-52.
29
30
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reading of the text of the Amendment and the interpretation most faithful to its
drafting history.32 Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens’ dissent on the rejection of
the Standard Model.33 Even though the Heller Court was sharply divided, because
the majority opinion adopted the Standard Model, it is the interpretation of the
Second Amendment that will apply in all cases after Heller. Therefore, for the
purpose of this thesis, it is important to explain the Standard Model. It is crucial to
understand what the Second Amendment protects, as interpreted by the majority in
Heller, in order to understand how the right may be regulated after Heller.
The Standard Model
A Right Inherited from England
When drafting the Bill of Rights, the Founding Fathers drew upon concepts
from English law and the rights guaranteed to English citizens. The origin of the
Second Amendment can be traced back to fifteenth century England.34
In 1671 King Charles II instituted the Game Act, which banned most people,
except an elite few, from owning firearms. When Catholic King James II took the
throne in 1685, he enforced the Game Act in regions home to his Protestant enemies
to effectively disarm his political opponents.35 James II was overthrown during the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, at which point Parliament made a list of grievances
against him, later to be turned into a Bill of Rights. Parliament then appointed

Heller 554 U.S. 570, 2 (Stevens, J. Dissenting).
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 1 (Breyer, J. Dissenting).
34 Nicholas J. Johnson, et al., Firearms Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy
(New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012).
35 Tushnet, Out of Range, 16.
32
33
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William and Mary of Orange to power, contingent on their acceptance of the Bill of
Rights.36
After the previous two tyrants, the English were wary of too much military
power in the hands of the state. Because of this, the British Declaration of Rights,
adopted in 1689, specifically included the right of Protestants to own arms. Article 7
of the Declaration stated, “That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms
for their Defense suitable to their Condition, and as allowed by Law.”37 This
language is understood to protect an individual right to own firearms for selfdefense. The Standard Model argues that the right to keep and bear arms was
fundamental to English subjects by the time of American colonization, and thus was
recognized by the colonists.38
Drafting History
Just as the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II tried to disarm political
opponents in England in the 1600’s, British authorities tried to disarm the colonists
as the their opposition to Britain grew in the late 1700’s. In 1774 Britain banned the
export of arms and ammunition to the colonies and British soldiers began to
confiscate ammunition that belonged to the militia in Massachusetts, one of the
most rebellious areas. Britain’s attempts at disarmament provoked confrontations

Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 26.
Tushnet, Out of Range, 16.
38 Stephen Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” Memorandum
Opinion for the Attorney General, Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, (Volume No. 28), retrieved
from http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2004/08/31/op-olc-v028p0126.pdf.,174; Kates, 10.
36
37
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and eventually ignited the Revolutionary War when British soldiers tried to seize
colonists’ arms in Concord and Lexington.39
For several years after the Revolutionary War, the new nation was troubled
by a weak central government.40 When the Constitution was framed the Founders
needed to create a representative government that was also strong enough to
enforce treaties and take a place on the international stage. The proposed
Constitution that emerged from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 created a
strong central government, but did not provide security for a free people.41 Antifederalists opposed the Constitution in its original form, fearing that it gave the
central government too much power. They proposed a series of amendments to be
made to the body of the Constitution that would reduce the federal government’s
power. Federalists, on the other hand, pushed for ratifying the Constitution in its
original form and agreed to consider the addition of further guards for private rights
afterwards.42 Several states proposed bills of rights during their ratifying
conventions.43
The militia and the right to bear arms was one of the topics covered during
the ratification debates. The proposed Constitution divided powers over the militia
in Article 1 Section 8, giving the federal government the power to organize, arm, and
call the militia to action, and giving the states the power to appoint officers and train
the militia.44 Anti-federalists feared that the proposed Constitution gave the central
Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” 176-177.
Tushnet, Out of Range, 13.
41 Tushnet, Out of Range, 13-15.
42 Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 16.
43 Tushnet, Out of Range, 15.
44 Tushnet, Out of Range, 14.
39
40
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government too much power over the militia and argued that they would easily be
able to destroy it. Anti-federalists proposed an amendment to go in the body of the
Constitution to protect states’ ability to maintain militias.45 Many of the proposed
bills of rights from the states included protection for the right to bear arms. The
states’ proposals used language that supported an individual right to arms but also
praised the citizen militia.46
The Federalist-dominated first Congress was not keen on decreasing the
power of the central government. They rejected the Anti-federalists’ proposed
revisions and it was the states’ proposals that became the stepping-stone for the
Second Amendment.47 Proponents of the Standard Model rely on this analysis to
argue that because the Second Amendment was based on the states’ proposals, not
the Anti-federalists’, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear
arms, not the ability of states to maintain militias.48
State Constitutions that both preceded, and immediately followed the
ratification of the Second Amendment included language about the right to bear
arms as an individual right. Before the Bill of Rights was ratified, four states had
analogues to the Second Amendment. Of these four states, two states, Pennsylvania
and Vermont, specifically established an individual right to gun ownership
unconnected to militia service.49 The two other states, North Carolina and
Massachusetts, specified the right for public safety reasons and common defense. In

Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” 186-187.
Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” 185-186.
47 Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 18.
48 Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” 186.
49 Tushnet, Out of Range, 22.
45
46
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each instance, in the early to mid 1800’s the state’s Supreme Court interpreted the
provision to refer to individual rights.50
Between 1789 and 1820, nine states adopted provisions analogous to the
Second Amendment. Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri referred to the right of
the people to, “bear arms in defense of himself and the state.” Mississippi,
Connecticut, and Alabama used the wording that each citizen has the, “right to bear
arms in defense of himself and the state.” Tennessee and Maine both used language
about common defense similar to Massachusetts’ Constitution.51 Proponents of the
Standard Model argue that the existence of so many Second Amendment analogues
in states’ Constitutions that explicitly guarantee an individual right to gun
ownership for purposes other than militia service, proves that this right was a
common value at the time of the Founding.52
Text
Proponents of the Standard Model argue that the text of the Second
Amendment further supports the view that it protects an individual right to bear
arms for purposes other than militia service. They argue that the prefatory clause
announces the purpose of the Amendment, and the operative clause states the
actual right. The prefatory clause reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State…” When the Second Amendment was ratified, the
Revolution was still fresh in the minds of the colonists and they recognized the
importance of the citizen militia as one of the most relevant reasons to protect the

Tushnet, Out of Range, 23-24.
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 29-30.
52 Bradbury, “Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right,” 185.
50
51
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individual right to bear arms. The prefatory clause explains that the Second
Amendment is being included in the Bill of Rights in response to the Revolution, but
it does not limit the scope of the right in the operative clause.53 It is necessary to
analyze the language of the operative clause to determine what the protected right
is. If the operative clause does protect an individual right to gun ownership, then the
prefatory clause does not limit that right to be only in relation to militia service.
The operative clause of the Second Amendment states, “…the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The phrase, “the right of the
people” is used exactly in the First and Fourth Amendments and very similar
language is used in the Ninth Amendment. All three of these other instances refer to
individual rights.54 Wherever rights are attributed to “the people” elsewhere in the
Constitution, the rights are individual rights.55 The phrase “the people” is only used
three times in the Constitution to refer to people as a collective entity, and in all
three of these instances it is in terms of the exercise or reservation of powers, not
rights. For these reasons, proponents of the Standard Model argue that the phrase
‘the right of the people’ in the Second Amendment refers to an individual right.
When “the people” is used elsewhere in the Constitution it refers to all members of a
political community, not a specified subset. At the time of the Founding, the militia
was defined as all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.
Proponents of the Standard Model assert that it would be an anomaly if the right

Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 12.
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 645.
55 Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 12.
53
54
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contained in the operative clause of the Second Amendment were only meant to
apply to this specific subset of “the people,” and not to all law-abiding citizens.56
The term “Arms” is commonly understood to mean weapons of offense or
defense and does not only specifically refer to weapons designated for military use.
“Keep” means to retain; to have in custody. When the phrase “keep arms” is used,
the most natural interpretation is to “possess weapons.” The word “bear” means to
carry for the purpose of confrontation, but this does not need to be in relation to
military participation. Proponents of the Standard Model maintain that the phrases
“keep arms” and “bear arms” have commonly been used in reference to military
participation, but this does not mean that military participation the only context in
which they may be interpreted.57 The nature of the phrases causes them to be used
often in a military context, but does not exclude them from also applying to
individual self-defense.58
In Heller the Supreme Court relied on the historical and textual analysis
presented above, and thus concluded that the Standard Model is the proper
interpretation of the Second Amendment. While the bulk of the opinion was
dedicated to this analysis, the latter part of the opinion is extremely important for
understanding Heller’s impact, or lack thereof, on gun control laws.
District of Columbia v. Heller
A substantial portion of the Heller opinion was dedicated to an analysis on
the original meaning of the Second Amendment, which was explained in the

Tushnet, Out of Range,
Kates, “Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,” 13.
58 Tushnet, Out of Range, 7.
56
57
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previous section of this Chapter. The Court concluded that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for purposes other than militia
service. While this conclusion is significant because it clarified the meaning of the
Second Amendment, the end of the opinion is arguably the most important part for
understanding what the Second Amendment protects and they ways in which the
right can be regulated.
After concluding that the Second Amendment does protect an individual
right, the Heller opinion included a section on the limitations of the right. The Court
made it clear that the Second Amendment does not invalidate all gun regulations.
Justice Scalia wrote:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.59
Justice Scalia also specified in the opinion that prohibitions on carrying ‘dangerous
and unusual weapons’ are constitutional.60 The opinion specifically identified that
these types gun control laws that are constitutional, but it made clear that the list is
not exhaustive.
After establishing the right protected by the Second Amendment and certain
limitations, the Heller opinion assessed the constitutionality of D.C.’s laws, which
banned handgun possession in the home and required any lawfully owned firearms

59
60

Heller 554 U.S. 570, 54.
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 55.
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in the home to be unloaded or bound by a trigger lock.61 The Supreme Court
identified that the right of self-defense is central to the Second Amendment right,
handguns are the most popular class of firearms chosen for self-defense, and the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home.62 For these
reasons the Court determined that the ‘core’ of the Second Amendment right is that
of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense.63
Because D.C.’s laws, “…ban from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation
to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family,” the Supreme Court held
that they would fail constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny applied to
enumerated constitutional rights.64 D.C.’s laws were so severe that they banned the
exercise of the core right of the Second Amendment, so the Court found them to be
clearly unconstitutional.
McDonald v. City of Chicago
Heller confirmed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
keep and bear arms for self-defense, but because the District of Columbia falls under
federal jurisdiction, Heller did not consider whether the right applies to the states.
Soon after Heller, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether or not the Second
Amendment right is protected from state infringement in McDonald v. City of
Chicago. This case was brought by Otis McDonald and three other petitioners, all
residents of Chicago who wished to keep handguns in their homes for self-defense.
The petitioners challenged Chicago’s firearm laws, which banned the possession of
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 1.
Heller 554 U.S. 570, 56.
63 Heller 554 U.S. 570, 58.
64 Heller 554 U.S. 570, 56-57.
61
62
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handguns in the home, just like the laws struck down in Heller. Chicago argued that
their handgun ban is constitutional because the Second Amendment only restricts
the power of the federal government. The petitioners argued that the Second
Amendment does apply to the states and therefore Chicago’s handgun ban violates
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court decided the case in
2010, holding that like most of the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Second
Amendment right is fully applicable to the states.65
The petitioners made two claims, first that the Second Amendment right is
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that a state may not abridge the “privileges or immunities of the
United States.” In 1873 in the Slaughter-House Cases66, the Supreme Court held that
the Second Amendment is not protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and the petitioners asked the Court to overturn this precedent. Second, the
petitioners argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which says that a state may not deprive, “any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law,” applies the Second Amendment right to the states.67
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ first argument and refused to
reconsider their previous interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
the Slaughter-House Cases. Since the late 19th century, the Court has considered
whether specific rights in the Bill of Rights are protected from state infringement
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under the Due Process Clause,68 so the Supreme Court could decide the case without
overturning precedent. The Court stuck to their established approach and
considered whether the Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment
right.
In order to determine if the Second Amendment right was protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court adopted the
approach from previous cases that applied rights from the Bill of Rights to the
states.69 Over time the Supreme Court has adopted a theory of selective
incorporation; that the Due Process Clause incorporates particular rights contained
in the first eight Amendments.70 The governing standard to determine if a right is
incorporated is whether the right is fundamental to our Nation’s scheme of ordered
liberty and system of justice.71 The Court has also accepted a relaxed standard that
considers whether a right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’.72
After establishing the framework for reviewing the challenge, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether the Second Amendment fit the criteria to be incorporated
by the Due Process Clause. The Court relied on the historical analysis from the
majority opinion in Heller to show that the Second Amendment right is deeply
rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition.73 The Court also concluded that the
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers counted the right to keep and bear arms as
fundamental to the Nation’s system of ordered liberty.74
After concluding that the Second Amendment right is incorporated by the
Due Process Clause, the McDonald opinion included a brief section re-emphasizing
the point made in Heller, that the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. Justice
Alito wrote, “It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law
that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to
keep and bear arms is not ‘a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’… We repeat those assurances
here.”75
Heller and McDonald held that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to bear arms and that this right is incorporated against the states, but the
decisions left open many questions. Heller articulated that the core of the Second
Amendment right is that of law-abiding citizens to keep a handgun in the home for
the purpose of self-defense. The challenged laws in both Heller and McDonald
completely prohibited the ability of law-abiding citizens to keep handguns in the
home for self-defense. Because these laws were among the strictest in the nation,
the Supreme Court found them to be clearly unconstitutional. The Supreme Court’s
decisions left lingering questions about the constitutionality of gun control laws that
are not so restrictive. The Court failed to articulate a method of review for lower
courts to use to review Second Amendment challenges, and they failed to clarify the
scope of the Second Amendment’s protections beyond what Heller identified as the
74
75
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‘core’ right. Inundated with Second Amendment challenges after Heller and
McDonald, the lower courts were tasked with answering these questions and
developing Second Amendment doctrine.
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Chapter 2:
Developing Second Amendment Doctrine

Heller and McDonald opened the floodgate for challenges to state gun control
laws, but the opinions did not provide a significant amount of guidance for lower
courts to resolve these challenges. The Supreme Court did not establish a test or
standard of review for lower courts to use to evaluate the constitutionality of gun
control laws.76 The Heller opinion implied that a form of ‘heightened scrutiny’ may
be appropriate, but did not specify what form. In general, heightened scrutiny
evaluates the relationship between a challenged law and a government interest in
order to determine if the law is constitutional. Different levels of heightened
scrutiny have different requirements for how close the relationship between the law
and the government’s interest must be. The most demanding form of heightened
scrutiny is called strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny the challenged law must
further a compelling state interest and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.77 The lesser form of heightened scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, requires
that there is a reasonable fit between the challenged law and a substantial
government objective.78
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The standard of scrutiny that a court uses to evaluate the constitutionality of
a law is important because it can impact the outcome of the case. If strict scrutiny is
applied in Second Amendment cases gun control laws will be more vulnerable to
challenges, and if intermediate scrutiny is applied, the laws are more likely to be
upheld. This is why it is so significant that Heller sparked an influx of Second
Amendment challenges but didn’t specify how to determine what level of scrutiny to
apply. In the absence of explicit directions from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have established a method for reviewing Second Amendment challenges based on
implications in Heller and McDonald that a form of heightened scrutiny is
appropriate, and have drawn on First Amendment doctrine to determine the correct
level of scrutiny to apply.79
Implications in Heller and McDonald
The Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald did not articulate a specific
standard of review as is customary when evaluating a challenge to an enumerated
constitutional right, because the laws in question were so extreme that they failed
constitutional muster under all standards of scrutiny.80 Justice Scalia explains in
Heller:
The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose [selfdefense]. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the
standards of scrutiny we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,
banning from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’
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and use for protection of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional
muster.81
The opinion then references Second Amendment case law from 1840 in State v. Reid
to further justify why the Court does not need to apply a form of heightened
scrutiny:
A statute which, under the pretense of regulating, amounts to a destruction
of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly
useless for the purpose of defense, would be clearly unconstitutional.82
The challenged laws in Heller and McDonald did amount to a destruction of the
Second Amendment right, and thus were ‘clearly unconstitutional,’ so the Supreme
Court didn’t need to apply a standard of review to determine the laws’
constitutionality. As a result, the Court failed to create a specific framework for
lower courts to use to determine the appropriate standard of review when a
challenged law is not as restrictive as the laws struck down in Heller and McDonald.
Even though the Supreme Court did not make explicit what standard of
review to apply in Second Amendment cases, the Heller and McDonald opinions did
provide some guidance for lower courts. By reasoning that they did not need to
apply a form of heightened scrutiny because the challenged laws were so restrictive
that they would fail constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny, the
Supreme Court implied that in cases where the challenged law doesn’t impose such
a restrictive burden, heightened scrutiny would be appropriate. If the Court did not
believe that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate way to analyze Second
Amendment challenges, they would not have even mentioned that the challenged
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laws in Heller and McDonald failed all levels; the argument would have been
irrelevant.
In addition to suggesting that applying a form of heightened scrutiny is the
appropriate method of review for Second Amendment challenges, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected two methods of review: rational basis review and what is
called an “interest-balancing” inquiry.83
Rational basis review is the most lenient form of heightened scrutiny. It only
requires that the challenged law be rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.84 The Supreme Court rejected this form of review because it is usually only
used to analyze laws that do not implicate constitutional rights.85 There are specific
constitutional provisions that prohibit irrational laws, so if a gun control law only
needs to be ‘rational’ to pass constitutional muster, the Second Amendment
wouldn’t be necessary.86 Irrational gun control laws could be invalidated by the
aforementioned constitutional provisions instead of the Second Amendment.
Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion in Heller in which he endorsed
using an “interest-balancing” inquiry to determine the constitutionality of
challenged laws in Second Amendment cases. This approach would consider
whether the challenged law burdens a protected interest to an extent that is
disproportional to the law’s positive impact on other important governmental
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interests.87 The majority opinion in Heller explicitly rejected this approach, arguing
that it places too much power in the hands of the judiciary. Justice Scalia wrote that
an interest-balancing inquiry gives the judiciary, “…the power to decide on a caseby-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”88 He argued that an
interest-balancing inquiry would give judges the power to protect or deny
constitutional rights based on their usefulness. Justice Alito reiterated this rejection
of judicial interest-balancing in the McDonald opinion.89
In the absence of any explicit directions from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have mimicked the structure of the analyses in Heller and McDonald to
develop a basic framework for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. Many
lower courts interpreted the Supreme Court opinions to suggest a two-prong test.
The first prong asks whether the challenged law burdens conduct within the scope
of the Second Amendment.90 The Second Amendment does not protect any and all
conduct relating to guns, so the first step in assessing the constitutionality of a gun
control law is to determine if it even interferes with the protected right. If the
challenged law does not interfere with the Second Amendment right, then the law is
constitutional and the analysis is over. If the challenged law does burden the Second
Amendment right, courts proceed to the second prong of the test and apply a level of
heightened scrutiny to determine if the law is constitutional.91 Even when a law
burdens a constitutionally protected right it will be upheld if the government can
Heller 554 U.S. 570 (Breyer, J. Dissenting), 10.
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demonstrate a relationship between the law and an important government
objective. Although Heller and McDonald suggest this two-prong framework, the
opinions fail to provide instructions on how to determine what level of heightened
scrutiny to apply. Because of this, lower courts have had to look to other
constitutional areas for guidance and have drawn on First Amendment doctrine.92
The Marzzarella Test
The two-prong test was first articulated by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2010 in United States v. Marzzarella, and thus is
known as the Marzzarella test.93 Marzzarella considered the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law that criminalized the possession of a firearm with an obliterated
serial number.94 The Third Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller to
assess the challenge and develop a method of review.95
The first prong of the Marzzarella test considers whether the burden
imposed by the challenged law falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
protections. In Marzzarella the Third Circuit compared this prong to the process
used by courts to evaluate First Amendment challenges, writing, “… the preliminary
issue in a First Amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or
unprotected.”96 Similarly, because Heller and McDonald made it clear that the right
to bear arms is not absolute and that there are significant restrictions on the scope
of the right,97 Second Amendment cases must first determine whether the burdened
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F .3d (3rd Cir. 2010), 25.
Sipf, “Valid Constitutional Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms,” 727.
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conduct is protected by the Amendment. If the burdened conduct does not fall
within the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee, then the analysis ends and the
challenged law is upheld. 98
If the burdened conduct is within the scope of the Amendment, then the
court proceeds to the second prong and applies a level of heightened scrutiny.99 In
order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply in Marzzarella, the Third Circuit
drew on First Amendment doctrine. The court relied on the First Amendment
because Heller made multiple analogies between the First and Second
Amendment.100 In First Amendment doctrine, the level of scrutiny differs by case
and depends on the type of law that is being challenged and the type of speech at
issue. Strict scrutiny is invoked when a law considerably burdens the central
protection of the right, and intermediate scrutiny is applied when a law only
burdens the time, place, or manner in which a First Amendment right may be
exercised.101 The Third Circuit concluded that the same principles should be applied
in Second Amendment cases; the level of scrutiny should depend on the type of law
that is being challenged and the type of conduct at issue.102 Laws that considerably
burden the central right protected by the Amendment, the right of law-abiding
citizens to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense, should be subjected to
strict scrutiny and laws that only burden the manner of exercising the right should
be assessed under intermediate scrutiny.
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The two-prong Marzzarella test quickly became the prevailing method of
review among federal circuit courts of appeals for evaluating Second Amendment
challenges.103 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have all
explicitly interpreted Heller to suggest a two-prong approach.104
While most105 lower courts agree that Heller and McDonald suggest a twoprong approach, a few courts have disagreed that applying varying forms of
heightened scrutiny is the appropriate way to evaluate Second Amendment
challenges that are within the scope of the Amendment.106 Courts have taken
alternative approaches; some have held that strict scrutiny should be universally
applied in Second Amendment cases107 while others have held intermediate
scrutiny should be universally applied.108 Courts have also applied hybrid forms of
scrutiny that fall somewhere between intermediate and strict scrutiny.109 Some
courts didn’t use heightened scrutiny at all and instead applied an undue burden
test, which considers if there is a substantial obstacle in the path of exercise of the
right.110
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This disagreement on the appropriate level of scrutiny is important to note,
but the approach adopted in Marzzarella is the appropriate way to determine
heightened scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. The First and Second
Amendments are similar because they can both be burdened to varying degrees.111
For this reason, there is no one level of heightened scrutiny that should always be
applied. It is appropriate for courts to use First Amendment doctrine to develop a
way to review Second Amendment challenges because of this similarity that both
rights can be burdened in multiple ways, but the actual protections of the rights
themselves are extremely different. The differences between the First and Second
Amendment rights will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
The method of review that a court uses to evaluate the constitutionality of a
law usually impacts the outcome of the case, but in Second Amendment cases laws
have been almost uniformly upheld no matter how they are reviewed.112 Even when
courts have applied strict scrutiny, gun control laws have been upheld.113 This
peculiarity is attributable to the unique properties of the Second Amendment. The
function of guns is to harm people and the government’s job is to protect people. For
this reason public safety will always be a compelling government interest in Second
Amendment cases. Furthermore, the government, not the judiciary, is the expert on
public safety and crime prevention, so courts must give a high deference to the
legislature’s findings when evaluating the fit between a challenged law and the
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stated government interest.114 The relationship between the government’s duty to
promote public safety and the Second Amendment right to own guns has had a
significant impact on the outcome of challenges to gun control laws in the lower
courts after Heller and McDonald.
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Chapter 3:
Second Amendment Challenges in the Lower Courts

Since Heller was decided in 2008, there have been over 1,000 Second
Amendment cases challenging gun laws in courts nationwide.115 Gun regulations of
all kinds have been challenged after Heller and McDonald, including concealed and
open carry regulations, laws banning the possession of firearms by suspect classes
of individuals, firearm ownership regulations, firearm safety regulations, and
regulations on particularly dangerous weapons and accessories.116 Even though the
conduct regulated by the challenged laws is vastly different and lower courts have
used different methods of review, the majority of challenges have had the same
result: the challenge is rejected and the statute upheld.117 Of the 1,000 cases since
2008, a whopping 94% have upheld the challenged law.118
Esteemed Supreme Court litigator Paul Clement and other gun rights
advocates condemn this trend, arguing that the lower courts have undertaken a
“…widespread, determined resistance to enforcing the enumerated, fundamental
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”119 This theory, however, is discredited
by the Supreme Court’s silence on Second Amendment issues after Heller and
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McDonald. In the past seven years the Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari
in over 60 Second Amendment cases.120 The Court has refused to grant certiorari to
cases of all kinds, including cases that have upheld some of the most restrictive gun
laws. The Supreme Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of concealed carry
restrictions and denied certiorari to Kachalsky v. Cacace121, in which the Second
Circuit upheld New York’s proper cause requirement. They also denied certiorari to
United States v. Reese122, in which the Tenth Circuit upheld a federal law prohibiting
people subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms.
The Seventh Circuit upheld a law banning the possession of assault weapon and
high-capacity magazines in Friedman v. Highland Park123, and a law requiring the
registration of all firearms Justice v. Town of Cicero124, and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in both cases. The Court also refused to hear Jackson v. City and County of
San Francisco125, in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a local law requiring handguns in
the home to be stored in a locked container or disabled when not carried on the
person, and United States v. Masciandaro126, in which the Fourth Circuit upheld a law
prohibiting the possession of a loaded weapon in a national park.127
The same five justices formed the majority in both Heller and McDonald, and
until very recently, all remained on the Supreme Court. Four votes are required for
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the Court to grant certiorari to a case, so at least two justices (although not
necessarily the same two) from the Heller and McDonald majority have voted to
refuse certiorari in each of the 60 Second Amendment cases brought before the
Court in the past seven years.128 The Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of Second
Amendment cases proves that the lower courts are not engaging in a widespread
resistance to precedent, but rather Heller and McDonald are very limited and don’t
contradict most gun laws in America.129
Moreover, the fact that nearly all Second Amendment challenges have been
rejected even after the vast expansion of the understanding of Second Amendment
rights in Heller and McDonald is not a ‘widespread, determined resistance’ by the
lower courts, but rather a result of the inevitable conflict between the state’s
responsibility to protect public safety and the Second Amendment. The Second
Amendment is inherently unique given the function of guns and the role of the
government; the function of guns is to harm people while one of the main
responsibilities of the government is to protect people. Because guns cause injury
and death, most state laws regulating the Second Amendment right will survive
constitutional challenges.
The Unique Second Amendment
It is undisputed that guns harm people. On average, eighty Americans die
from gunshots everyday.130 This amounts to about thirty thousand deaths every
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year. Suicide, homicide, and deaths resulting from firearm-related accidents are
more common in homes that have guns and in communities with a higher
prevalence of guns.131 Because of the inherently harmful nature of guns, the
government’s regulation of Second Amendment rights is unique; it is a matter of life
and death.132 No other right protected by the Constitution compromises public
safety as much as the right to own a gun. While it is true that speech can cause harm,
and at times even injury or death, it is obvious that the harm caused by guns is of an
entirely different magnitude.133 As a First Amendment scholar said, “If words
actually killed eighty people each day, there would be much higher demand for
regulation, and that demand would beget a supply.”134 Legislatures have drawn on
the empirical evidence surrounding gun-related injuries and deaths and have
developed laws to prevent gun violence.
When gun control laws are challenged, as discussed in Chapter 2, lower
courts usually apply a form of heightened scrutiny to evaluate the laws’
constitutionality. Under heightened scrutiny the government must demonstrate that
they have an interest in regulating the right and that the challenged law is related to
this interest.135 Because guns cause injuries and deaths, in most Second Amendment
cases the government automatically has an important interest in regulating guns:
public safety. The government’s substantial interest in promoting public safety is
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considered “self-evident,”136 so the government only bears the burden of proving
the relationship between that interest and the challenged law.
When evaluating the relationship between the government’s interest and a
challenged law, courts have long recognized the policymaking expertise of the
legislature and have afforded substantial deference to their judgments. 137 It is the
government’s job to determine what laws will further their interests; they are the
experts on effective crime prevention, not the courts.138 Furthermore, the
government must have, “…a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems…”139 This is especially true, however, when the
‘problem’ involves injury and death.
When applying heightened scrutiny in Second Amendment cases, deference
to legislative findings on the relationship between a challenged law and the
government’s interests leads to the survival of all but the most extreme gun control
laws. The government has a self-evident, substantial interest in public safety, and
there is significant empirical evidence on the prevalence of gun-related injuries and
deaths. For these reasons, it is not difficult for the government to demonstrate a
reasonable fit between a law regulating guns and an interest in increasing public
safety.140 Because of this relationship, the vast majority of gun control laws have
survived challenges.
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A closer study of two lower court cases that rejected Second Amendment
challenges, and were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, will illuminate how
the Second Amendment’s protections are unique and often limited. I chose two very
different cases in order to illustrate how the overwhelming majority of cases have
had the same results, the law upheld and the challenge rejected, no matter the type
of law that is challenged. The first case, Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,
considered a law that required handguns to be kept in a locked box or otherwise
disabled when not carried on the person. This law is very similar to the trigger lock
requirement struck down in Heller, but the Ninth Circuit held that the law in Jackson
is constitutional. The second case, Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, considered a
law that regulated conduct in an entirely different sphere than the laws struck down
in Heller and McDonald. In Kachalsky, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s law
requiring individuals to demonstrate a heightened need in order to obtain a license
to carry concealed firearms in public. A study of these two cases on opposite ends of
the gun control spectrum will demonstrate why 94% of all Second Amendment
cases after Heller and McDonald have had the same result, the challenge thrown out
and law upheld.141
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Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco
Firearm safety storage laws have been among some of the most disputed
because these laws regulate conduct that Heller and McDonald deemed to be at the
core of the Second Amendment right, that of law-abiding citizens within the home to
use handguns for self-defense. Even given their close relation to the core right,
lower courts have consistently found firearm storage regulations constitutional. One
case in particular, Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, garnered a lot of
attention. An analysis of the decision will illustrate why even after Heller and
McDonald the overwhelming majority of Second Amendment challenges have been
thrown out. Laws that regulate firearm storage in the home do not represent a
resistance to Heller and McDonald, but rather are a recognition of the Second
Amendment’s unique properties. Unlike other constitutionally protected rights,
guns function to cause injury and death, so the ways in which the right to bear arms
can be regulated are more substantial than in the case of other rights, like free
speech.
Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco was heard by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in 2013. A woman named Espanola Jackson brought a suit
against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of two
San Francisco regulations under the Second Amendment.142 The first law, San
Francisco Police Code 4512, required handguns to be stored in a locked container at
home or disabled with a trigger lock when not carried on the person. The second
law, San Francisco Police Code 613, prohibited the sale of hollow point ammunition
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within San Francisco. Jackson argued that the laws obstructed her ability to keep a
handgun in her home in a manner ready for immediate use for self-defense, and
therefore violated her Second Amendment right.143 The focus of this analysis is on
Police Code 4512, the firearm safety storage regulation, given its similarity to the
trigger-lock requirement struck down in Heller.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court invalidated a D.C. law that
required firearms to be kept unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock
when in the home.144 The challenged law in Jackson requires handguns to be stored
in a locked container or disabled with a trigger lock when not carried on a person.145
These two laws initially seem analogous, as they regulate the same conduct and
serve the same purpose, but the exception to the San Francisco law allowing
individuals to keep a loaded handgun on their person is a crucial distinction. The
trigger lock requirement struck down in Heller constituted an absolute ban on the
core Second Amendment right, the right to keep and use a handgun in the home for
self-defense, while the law in Jackson only regulates the manner in which a person
may exercise this right. Because the challenged law in Jackson was significantly less
burdensome than the law struck down in Heller, the Ninth Circuit could not rely
entirely on the Heller opinion to determine the constitutionality of San Francisco
Police Code 4512. The Ninth Circuit followed the approach of many of its sister
circuits and adopted the two-prong Marzzarella test, as discussed in Chapter 2. The
Ninth Circuit first considered whether section 4512 regulated conduct within the
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scope of the Second Amendment’s protections, and then considered whether it
passed the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit first undertook the task of determining if section 4512
regulated conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. The court found that
the regulated conduct fell within the scope of the Second Amendment because it did
not resemble any conduct barred by longstanding prohibitions or regulatory
measures that are presumptively lawful. Founding-era laws regulating firearm and
gunpowder storage served only as fire-safety regulations, not gun-safety
regulations, and did not ban keeping loaded weapons. Because section 4512 serves
an entirely different purpose than the founding-era laws, it is not historically
longstanding and the regulated conduct falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection.146 The Ninth Circuit proceeded to determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to section 4512.147
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Supreme Court did not apply a level of
heightened scrutiny in Heller because the challenged laws imposed such severe
restrictions on the core Second Amendment right that they, “amount to a
destruction of the [Second Amendment] right,” and thus failed constitutional muster
under all levels of scrutiny.148 Because the handgun storage regulation imposed by
section 4512 in Jackson was less restrictive than the trigger lock requirement in
Heller, the Ninth Circuit needed to apply a level of heightened scrutiny to determine
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its constitutionality.149 Since Heller and McDonald offered no instruction on how to
determine what level of heightened scrutiny to apply, the Ninth Circuit used a test
they developed in a previous Second Amendment case, United States v. Chovan.150
When developing the test in Chovan, the Ninth Circuit followed the approach
used by the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, and looked to the First Amendment
as a guide.151 They wrote, “We agree with these courts’ determination that, just as in
the First Amendment context, the level of scrutiny in the Second Amendment
context should depend on ‘the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree
to which the challenged law burdens the right.’”152 The Ninth Circuit specifically
determined that, the level of scrutiny depends upon, “(1) how close the law comes to
the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law’s burden on
the right.”153 In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit articulated that intermediate scrutiny
would be appropriate if the challenged law doesn’t implicate a core Second
Amendment right or doesn’t place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment
right.154
In Jackson the Ninth Circuit considered whether section 4512 implicated the
core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the burden it placed on the
Second Amendment right to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. The court
found that section 4512 does implicate the core of the Second Amendment right
because it impacts the ability of a person to use a firearm in his or her home for selfRostron, “Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment,” 703.
Jackson 746 F .3d, 21.
151 United States v. Chovan 735 F .3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), 21.
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defense. The Ninth Circuit then determined, however, that even though section 4512
burdens the core of the Second Amendment right, it does not place a substantial
burden on the right.155 The court wrote:
Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden imposed by the
handgun ban at issue in Heller that rendered it unconstitutional. Unlike the
challenged regulation in Heller, section 4512 does not substantially prevent
law-abiding citizens from using firearms to defend themselves in the home.
Rather, section 4512 regulates how San Franciscans must store their
handguns when not carrying them on their persons. This indirectly burdens
the ability to use a handgun… But because it burdens only the manner in
which persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights, the regulation
more closely resembles a content-neutral speech restriction that regulates
only the time, place, or manner of speech. …Further, section 4512 leaves
open alternative channels for self-defense in the home, because San
Franciscans are not required to secure their handguns while carrying them
on their person.156
Because section 4512 implicates the core of the Second Amendment right but does
not impose a substantial burden on the right, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
intermediate scrutiny should be applied.157After determining the appropriate level
of scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit applied it to the facts of the case before them.
In order to survive intermediate scrutiny a challenged law must serve a
government objective that is significant, substantial, or important, and there must
be a reasonable fit between the challenged law and the asserted government
objective.158 The stated objective of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors was to
reduce the number of gun-related injuries and deaths that result from having an
unlocked handgun in the home.159 The Ninth Circuit wrote that it is “self-evident”
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that public safety is an important government interest,160 grounding this claim in
text from two Supreme Court opinions: Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab
(1989), holding that the government’s compelling interest in public safety justifies
drug testing of boarder agents who carry firearms, and Madsen v. Women’s Health
Ctr., Inc. (1994), that “The State also has a strong interest in ensuring the public
safety and order…”161 Because the government’s compelling interest in public safety
is self-evident and guns fundamentally compromise public safety, it is not difficult
for the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in most Second
Amendment cases. In Jackson, the legislature provided evidence that having an
unlocked or gun in the home is associated with increased gun-related injuries and
deaths.162 Because there is evidence that having unlocked guns in the home is
associated with gun-related injuries and deaths, and it is self-evident that the
government has an important interest in public safety, the Ninth Circuit held that
San Francisco appropriately demonstrated that section 4512 serves an important
interest.163
Given San Francisco’s important interest in reducing gun-related injuries and
deaths from having an unlocked handgun in the home, the government needed to
demonstrate that section 4512 was substantially related to this interest. When
considering the question of fit, the Ninth Circuit gave substantial deference to the
legislature’s findings, writing, “In considering a city’s justifications for its ordinance,
we do not impose ‘an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof… so long as whatever
Jackson 746 F .3d, 20-21.
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162 Jackson 746 F .3d, 20.
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evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem
that the city addresses,’”164 and that, “[the city must have,] …a reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems,”165 It is
necessary for courts to give high deference to legislative findings when considering
the fit between a challenged law and a government interest because the government
is the expert on public safety, not the court.166 In Jackson, the Ninth Circuit examined
the legislative findings accompanying section 4512 to determine its fit with the
stated government interest. Their analysis was a concise three sentences:
In the legislative findings accompanying section 4512, San Francisco
concluded that firearm injuries are the third-leading cause of death in San
Francisco, and that having unlocked firearms in the home increases the risk
of gun related injury, especially to children. The record contains ample
evidence that storing handguns in a locked container reduces the risk of both
accidental and intentional handgun-related deaths, including suicide. Based
on the evidence that locking firearms increases safety in a number of
different respects, San Francisco has drawn a reasonable inference that
mandating that guns be kept locked when not carried will increase public
safety and reduce firearm casualties.167
Gun control advocates argue that the Ninth Circuit too readily deferred to legislative
findings.168 This criticism is misplaced because it is not the court’s job to determine
what evidence is accurate or not. It is the government’s job, rather, to gather
information about public policy problems. The courts job then, is to make sure the
challenged law is reasonably related to the stated government interest, given the
evidence provided by the government.169
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It was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to rely on the legislature’s findings in
Jackson. The government provided empirical evidence that gun injuries and deaths
in the home are a problem and that storing handguns in locked containers or
otherwise disassembled reduces gun-related injuries and deaths in the home.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit appropriately held that San Francisco had
demonstrated a reasonable fit between section 4512 and their asserted objective.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jackson has also been criticized by gun rights
advocates for holding that the home is not entitled to an absolute protection when it
comes to Second Amendment rights.170 Even though section 4512 is not a complete
ban like the D.C. trigger-lock requirement invalidated in Heller, it still encroaches on
rights in a private, protected area.171 This criticism is misplaced because of the
unique character of the Second Amendment and the government’s role in promoting
public safety.
While it is true that section 4512 regulates the conduct of individuals within
a private, protected sphere, it is crucial that the government regulates this area
when it comes to firearm safety. The home is the sphere in which children, mentally
ill, or other vulnerable classes of people will be in the closest proximity to firearms.
Easy access leads to both accidents and suicide. 90% of firearm-related deaths
among children occurred in the victim’s home or at the home of a relative or friend,
and these occurred when children had access to loaded guns.172 Adolescents who
commit suicide successfully are twice as likely to have a gun in their home as
Sipf, “Valid Constitutional Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms,” 741-742.
Sipf, “Valid Constitutional Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms,” 738.
172 Brief of The Brady Center for Gun Violence as Amici Curiae, Jackson v. City and County of San
Francisco, 746 F .3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014), 6.
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compared to those who unsuccessfully attempt suicide.173 It is important that
firearms are stored safely because there exists no other regulation in the home to
protect these vulnerable classes of individuals from accessing them. Handling a
firearm does not become less dangerous in a private sphere, so there is no reason
that safety regulations should only apply in the public sphere when the objective of
the government is to increase safety and reduce firearm related injuries and deaths.
Jackson considered the constitutionality of a law that was similar to the
trigger-lock requirement struck down in Heller. In both cases, the challenged laws
regulated conduct in the home, which is at the core of the Second Amendment’s
protections. Bearing arms in public, on the other hand, does not implicate the core
Second Amendment right and thus is subject to more regulations. The ways the
Second Amendment right may be regulated in public will be illustrated in the
following analysis.
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Kachalsky v. County of Westchester
Heller and McDonald established that the core of the Second Amendment
right is that of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear handguns in the home for the
purpose of self-defense. Unlike firearm safety storage laws, which affect the conduct
of an individual in his or her home, concealed carry laws only regulate conduct
outside of the home and thus do not implicate the core of the Second Amendment.
The conduct regulated by the challenged laws in Heller and McDonald was only that
of individuals in the home and for this reason the Supreme Court provided little
indication of the scope of the Second Amendment outside of the home. Because of
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have arrived at different
conclusions as to whether carrying firearms in public is protected by the Second
Amendment. A circuit split has emerged with the Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits finding that the Second Amendment’s protections do extend outside the
home, the Tenth Circuit finding that they do not, and the Third and Fourth Circuits
choosing to avoid this question and proceeding directly to apply heightened
scrutiny.174 Even though lower courts have reached conflicting opinions on whether
carrying arms in public is within the scope of the Second Amendment, all but the
most extreme concealed carry laws have been upheld.175
New York has one of the most restrictive licensing schemes for carrying arms
in public,176 and it requires that an applicant demonstrate proper cause, or a need
distinguishable from that of the general public, to obtain a license to carry a
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concealed firearm in public for self-defense.177 New York’s law was challenged in
2012 in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, and was upheld. The Second Circuit’s
opinion in Kachalsky demonstrates how the rights protected by the Second
Amendment are unique, and specifically how they differ from the rights protected
by the First Amendment. The opinion also exemplifies why it is appropriate for
courts to give considerable deference to legislative findings when applying
heightened scrutiny in Second Amendment cases. Kachalsky is especially important
for my larger argument because the court’s opinion captures the unique properties
of the right to bear arms, which explains why the overwhelming majority of Second
Amendment cases have upheld gun control laws after Heller and McDonald.
In Kachalsky five Plaintiffs filed an action to challenge New York’s concealed
carry law after applying for and being denied full-carry concealed-handgun
licensees by licensing officers for failing to establish proper cause.178 New York
Penal Law section 400.00 is the only statute that regulates firearm licensing in New
York State.179 The plaintiffs specifically challenge section 400.00 (2) (f) which states
that a license, “…shall be issued to… have and carry [a firearm] concealed… by any
person when proper cause exists for the issuance thereof.”180 New York State courts
have defined proper cause as needing a firearm for target practice, hunting, or selfdefense. If an applicant demonstrates proper cause for target practice or hunting,
the resulting license is restricted to allow the carrying of a firearm only for that
purpose. To obtain a carry license without restrictions, an applicant must
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F .3d 81 (2nd Cir, 2012), 9.
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demonstrate proper cause for self-defense. In order to demonstrate proper cause
for self-defense, the applicant must show a need for protection distinguishable from
that of the general public. The license made available by section 400.00 (2) (f) is the
only one that allows a person to carry a concealed handgun without regard to
employment.181
Four of the five plaintiffs in Kachalsky made no claim that they had a proper
cause for self-defense when they applied for concealed carry licenses, and for that
reason, their applications were denied. One plaintiff, a transgender female, did claim
that she had proper cause, but failed to demonstrate that need because she did not,
“report… any type of threat to her own safety anywhere.”182
Rather than arguing that they were wrongfully denied proper cause,
Plaintiffs argue that the proper cause requirement violates the Second Amendment.
They assert that Heller established the right to carry arms in public for self-defense,
and therefore it is unconstitutional to require a law-abiding citizen to demonstrate
proper cause in order to exercise this right.183 Plaintiff Kachalsky argued that the
Second Amendment, “entitles him to an unrestricted permit without further
establishing proper cause.”184 In order to evaluate the Plaintiffs’ claim and
determine the constitutionality of section 400 (2) (f), the Second Circuit adopted the
two-prong Marzzarella test and first asked whether the law burdened conduct
within the scope of the Second Amendment and then applied heightened scrutiny.
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In order to begin their analysis of the constitutionality of section 400.00 (2)
(f), the Second Circuit first needed to determine whether the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protections extends to public places. Plaintiffs argued that Heller
established that the Second Amendment does guarantee a right to possess and use
firearms in public for self-defense, and that requiring an individual to demonstrate a
need to exercise this right is unconstitutional. In contrast, Defendants also invoked
Heller, but argued that the opinion limits the right to bear arms for self-defense to
the home, and therefore New York’s proper cause requirement does not burden
conduct within the scope of the Amendment.185
The Second Circuit examined the opinions in Heller and McDonald but
concluded that they provided no clear answer as to whether the scope of the Second
Amendment extends outside of the home. The challenged laws in Heller and
McDonald only regulated conduct within the home, so, the judges reasoned, there
was no need for the Supreme Court to analyze whether the Second Amendment also
protects the right to keep and bear arms in public.186 In the absence of clear
evidence, the Second Circuit drew on implications made by the Supreme Court in
Heller and McDonald to determine whether the scope of the Second Amendment
extends beyond the home, writing:
Although the Supreme Court’s cases applying the Second Amendment have
arisen only in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in
the home, the Court’s analysis suggests, as Justice Stevens’s dissent in Heller
and Defendants in this case before us acknowledge, that the Amendment
must have some application in the very different context of the public
possession of firearms.187
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The Second Circuit continued its analysis based on this assumption that the scope of
the Second Amendment extends to the public.188
Before determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenge
of section 400.00 (2) (f), the Second Circuit disputed an argument made by the
Plaintiffs that the court should apply First Amendment prior restraint analysis
instead of means-end scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of section 400.00 (2)
(f). Prior restraint in the First Amendment context is a government action that
prohibits certain speech before it can take place. Prior restraint can be exercised
either through a law that requires speakers to obtain a license before speaking, or
through a judicial injunction that prohibits certain speech.189 Prior restraint of
speech is almost never constitutional; the government bears an extremely heavy
burden of justifying a restraint.190
Prior restraints on speech are usually only applied to publications, and are
applied with the intent to protect national security.191 The relationship between
prior restraint and national security was put to the test in New York Times Co. v.
United States, in which the Nixon Administration tried to prevent the New York
Times from publishing a study regarding United States activities in Vietnam, arguing
that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security.192 The Supreme
Court held that the threat to national security in this case didn’t overcome the
Kachalsky 701 F .3d, 18.
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“heavy presumption against” prior restraint of the press.193 Justice Stewart wrote in
a concurring opinion that prior restraint is only permitted when speech, “…will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people.”194 The reason prior restraint of speech is held to such a high standard is
because free speech is, “…the very foundation of constitutional government.”195 Free
speech is regarded as a necessary component in maintaining a democracy, so speech
cannot be censored in anything other than the most extreme circumstances.
Plaintiffs in Kachalsky argue that the rights protected by the First and Second
Amendments are identical in nature and thus they should be treated equivalently.
The Second Circuit summarized the logic of the Plaintiffs as, “One has a right to
speak and a right to bear arms. Thus, just at the First Amendment permits everyone
to speak without obtaining a license, New York cannot limit the right to bear arms to
only some law-abiding citizens.”196 The Second Circuit rejected this logic,
articulating that, “…there are salient differences between the state’s ability to
regulate each of these rights.”197 The Second Circuit’s rejection of prior restraint
illuminates important distinctions between the rights protected by the First and
Second Amendments, and shows how the Second Amendment is unique.
Unlike the First Amendment, the Second Amendment is not the foundational
element of democracy itself.198 The First Amendment fulfills a fundamental role in
our democracy because it places a check on the government’s power to censor its
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873.
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opponents, preserving free political discussion. To quote Benjamin Franklin,
“Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the
freedom of speech.”199 Bearing arms, on the other hand, does not have such a special
status. The restriction of a person’s right to bear arms will not affect the overall
functioning of democracy. Because of these properties, the Second Amendment can
be regulated in ways the First Amendment cannot be.
After discrediting the Plaintiffs’ argument that prior restraint should be
applied, the court proceeded to the second prong of the Marzzarella test to
determine what level of heightened scrutiny to apply. The Second Circuit followed
the approach of many of their sister circuits and considered to what extent the core
of the Second Amendment right was burdened by the challenged law. The court
wrote, “Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply
to laws that burden the ‘core’ Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we
believe that applying less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does not burden
the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent sense in this context
and is in line with the approach taken by our sister circuits.”200 The Second Circuit
determined that section 400.00 (2) (f) does not burden the core Second Amendment
right identified in Heller, that of law-abiding individuals to keep and bear firearms in
the home for self-defense, because it only regulates conduct that takes place in
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public, and therefore concluded that it should be subjected to intermediate
scrutiny.201
Intermediate scrutiny requires that a challenged law be substantially related
to the achievement of an important government interest to pass constitutional
muster.202 Both Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed that New York had substantial
government interests in public safety and crime prevention, so the only remaining
question was whether section 400.00 (2) (f) was substantially related to those
interests.203 The Second Circuit gave considerable deference to the legislature to
determine this fit. They explained, “In the context of firearm regulation, the
legislature is ‘far better equipped than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy
judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying
firearms and the manner to combat those risks. Thus, our role is only ‘to assure that,
in formulating its judgments, [New York] has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.’”204
In Kachalsky the government provided evidence that New York identified the
dangers of carrying handguns in public over one-hundred years ago. Ever since
1913, New York officials have decided that a proper cause requirement was a
reasonable method for combating these dangers.205 The legislative record explained
that the state decided to regulate handgun possession because they thought it would
increase public safety and crime control by preventing violent crimes before they
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occur.206 The Second Circuit deferred to these legislative findings of the past onehundred years and concluded that New York’s proper cause requirement was
substantially related to New York’s important interests in public safety and crime
prevention and thus Penal Code section 400 (2) (f) was constitutional.207
The Second Circuit’s deference to legislative findings in Kachalsky
exemplifies why the vast majority of Second Amendment cases have had the same
results, namely the challenge dismissed and the law upheld, after Heller and
McDonald. Even though New York’s concealed carry licensing scheme is one of the
most restrictive in the country, the Second Circuit found that it was constitutional.
This is because the Second Amendment right can be regulated to a much greater
extent than other constitutionally protected rights because of the nature of what it
protects, the right to own guns. The function of guns is to injure and kill people, so
their possession always intersects with issues of public safety. For this reason, as
the Second Circuit stated, it is appropriate for the court to give the legislature
substantial leeway to make public policy decisions on how to combat the dangers of
firearms.208
Jackson and Kachalsky specifically demonstrated why safety storage
regulations and concealed carry regulations are constitutional, but the analyses in
these decisions can be applied to any type of gun control law. In all Second
Amendment challenges the government will have an interest in promoting public
safety and the courts will have a responsibility to defer to legislative findings, which
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explains why the overwhelming majority of gun control laws have been unaffected
by Heller and McDonald.

61

Concluding Thoughts:
A Change on the Supreme Court and the Second Amendment

As this thesis has made clear, the vast majority of Second Amendment
challenges have been unsuccessful in the lower courts in the years since Heller and
McDonald. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that this trend is legitimate by
refusing to grant certiorari in over sixty Second Amendment cases since Heller. As
explained in Chapter 3, the same five Justices formed the majority in Heller and
McDonald and only four votes are needed for a case to be granted certiorari, so at
least two Justices from the Heller and McDonald majorities have refused certiorari in
all of the 60 Second Amendment challenges brought before the Supreme Court. The
five Justices that formed the Heller and McDonald majorities all remained on the
Court until the recent death of Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller opinion. I will
briefly examine what Justice Scalia’s death and a change on the Supreme Court
might mean for the Second Amendment going forward.
Justice Scalia was a staple vote for the Court’s conservative coalition and was
known for his unwavering adherence to originalism as a judicial theory.209 Prior to
Justice Scalia’s death, there was a five-Justice conservative majority on the Supreme
Court. Now, absent a ninth Justice, the ideology of the Court is split down the middle.
Because a new Justice may not be appointed until after the next Presidential
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election, it is presently unclear what will happen to the ideological composition of
the Supreme Court.
Some conservative politicians predict that if the Court appoints one more
liberal Justice the liberal majority will take aim at conservative precedents of recent
years, including Heller and McDonald.210 Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz
said that Justice Scalia’s death, “…leaves us one Justice away from the Second
Amendment being written out of the Constitution altogether.”211 I disagree and
argue that regardless of the ideology of the next Justice, the Court will maintain their
silence on the Second Amendment. The curious trend examined by this thesis, the
lower courts’ consistent rejection of Second Amendment challenges, demonstrates
why.
Even with a liberal majority, the Supreme Court will not overturn Heller and
McDonald because the decisions have had a negligible impact on gun control laws.
The decisions were a initially a huge victory for proponents of gun rights because
they codified that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own
firearms for self-defense, however, it has become clear that this interpretation
doesn’t compromise the vast majority of gun regulations. There is no motivation for
the dissenting Justices in Heller and McDonald to take a Second Amendment case
because they do not take issue with the results in lower courts. Going forward, the
Supreme Court will continue to let lower courts forge Second Amendment doctrine,
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and gun control laws will remain unaffected by the Supreme Court for the
foreseeable future.
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